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Abstract
We lay out a tractable model for ￿scal and monetary policy analysis in
a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such
policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets
the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the
country level, through the choice of government spending. The model incorpo-
rates country-speci￿c shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions,
the optimal policy requires that in￿ ation be stabilized at the union level by
the common central bank. On the other hand, the relinquishment of an in-
dependent monetary policy, coupled with nominal price rigidities, generates a
stabilization role for ￿scal policy, one beyond the e¢ cient provision of public
goods. Interestingly, the stabilizing role for ￿scal policy is shown to be desir-
able not only from the viewpoint of each individual country, but also from that
of the union as a whole
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The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has led to an array of new
challenges for policymakers. Those challenges have been re￿ ected most visibly in the
controversies surrounding the implementation and proposed reforms of the Stability
and Growth Pact, as well as in the frequent criticisms of the interest rate policy
implemented by the European Central Bank. From the perspective of macroeconomic
theory, the issues raised by EMU have created an urgent need for an analytical
framework that would allow us to evaluate alternative monetary and ￿scal policy
arrangements for EMU, or other monetary unions that may emerge in the future. In
the present paper we propose a tractable framework suitable for the analysis of ￿scal
and monetary policy in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal
design of such policies.
In our opinion that analytical framework has to meet several desiderata. First,
it has to incorporate some of the main features characterizing the optimizing models
with nominal rigidities that have been developed and used for monetary policy analy-
sis in recent years. Secondly, it should contain a ￿scal policy sector, with a purposeful
￿scal authority. Thirdly, the framework should comprise many open economies, linked
by trade and ￿nancial ￿ ows.
The framework we propose aims at meeting the three desiderata listed above.
First, we introduce nominal rigidities by assuming a staggered price setting struc-
ture, analogous to the one embedded in the workhorse model used for monetary pol-
icy analysis in closed economies, which we treat as a useful benchmark. Secondly, we
incorporate a ￿scal policy sector, by allowing for country-speci￿c levels of public con-
sumption, and by having the latter yield utility to domestic households. Finally, we
model the currency union as being made up of a continuum of small open economies,
subject to imperfectly correlated productivity shocks. That modelling choice stands
in contrast with most optimizing sticky price models of the world economy found in
the literature, where tractability often requires that they be restricted to two-country
world economies.1 Yet, while such a framework may be useful to discuss issues per-
taining to the links between two large economies (say, the U.S. and the euro area), it
1See, among others, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno and Be-
nigno (2003), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Devereux and Engle (2003), Pappa (2003), Koll-
mann (2001), Chari , Kehoe and McGrattan (2003). Only a subset of these contributions feature a
role for a ￿scal sector. For a recent analysis of monetary-￿scal policy interaction in a two-country
setting and ￿ exible exchange rates see Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). For a two-country analysis
more speci￿cally tailored to a monetary union, see Ferrero (2005).
1can hardly be viewed as a realistic description of the incentives and constraints facing
policymakers in a monetary union like EMU, currently made up of thirteen countries
(each with an independent ￿scal authority), but expected to accommodate as many
as twelve additional members over the next few years. Clearly, and in contrast with
models featuring two large economies, the majority of the countries in EMU are small
relative to the union as a whole. As a result, their policy decisions, taken in isolation,
are likely to have very little impact on other countries. By looking at the limiting
case of a continuum of economies, with each economy of negligible size relative to the
rest of the world, we overcome the tractability problems associated with ￿large N￿ .
Our analysis focuses on the optimal ￿scal and monetary policies from the view-
point of the currency union as a whole. In particular we determine the monetary
and ￿scal policy rules that maximize a second-order approximation to the integral
of utilities of the representative households inhabiting the di⁄erent countries in the
union.
Two main results emerge from that analysis. First, we show that it is optimal
for the (common) monetary authority to stabilize in￿ ation in the union as a whole.
Attaining that goal generally requires o⁄setting the threats to price stability that
may arise from the joint impact of the ￿scal policies implemented at the country
level. Our ￿nding would thus seem to provides a rationale for a monetary policy
strategy like the one adopted by the European Central Bank, i.e. one that focuses on
attaining price stability for the union as a whole. It is important to stress, however,
that the optimality of that policy is conditional on the national ￿scal authorities
simultaneously implementing their part of the optimal policy package. The latter
implies a neutral ￿scal stance in the aggregate ￿ in a sense to be made precise below￿ ,
which poses no in￿ ationary pressures on the union. We argue that, in the absence of
such coordinated response by the national ￿scal authorities, the union￿ s central bank
may ￿nd it optimal to deviate from a strict in￿ ation targeting policy.
Second, under the optimal policy arrangement, each country￿ s ￿scal authority
plays a dual role, trading-o⁄between the provision of an e¢ cient level of public goods
and the stabilization of domestic in￿ ation and output gap. Interestingly, we ￿nd that
the existence of such a stabilizing role for ￿scal policy is desirable not only from the
viewpoint of each individual country, but also from that of the union as a whole. Our
simulations under the optimal policy mix of a representative economy￿ s response to an
idiosyncratic productivity shock show that the strength of the countercyclical ￿scal
response increases with the importance of nominal rigidities. Such ￿nding may call
2into question the desirability of imposing external constraints on a currency union￿ s
members ability to conduct countercyclical ￿scal policies, when the latter seek to
limit the size of the domestic output gap and in￿ ation di⁄erentials resulting from
idiosyncratic shocks.
Before we turn to a description of our model we make a brief reference to the
related literature. Several recent papers have also used a microfounded DSGE frame-
work to analyze the nature of optimal policy in a currency union.2 Benigno (2004)
develops a model of a two-country monetary union, where each country is subject
to idiosyncratic shocks. In contrast with the present paper, Benigno￿ s analysis does
not deal with ￿scal policy, focusing instead on the characterization of the optimal
monetary policy by the common monetary authority. When countries di⁄er only in
size, he shows that the optimal policy requires that the price level for the union as a
whole be fully stabilized, a result consistent with the one we obtain under coordinated
policies.
Closer to the present paper, though written independently, Beetsma and Jensen
(2005; BJ, henceforth) have also analyzed the role of ￿scal stabilization policy in the
context of a monetary union. Although our optimal policy implications are similar
to theirs, our paper di⁄ers in several respects, both in terms of modelling choices
and the type of exercises conducted. Perhaps most noticeably, our model features a
continuum of small open economies, whereas BJ￿ s framework is a more conventional
two-country model. The ￿ exibility of this setup allows, among other things, to assess
the optimal policy problem for a small open economy considered in isolation (inside
or outside the monetary union), since the negligible size of each country implies the
absence of feedback e⁄ects from the rest of economies. In general, we believe our
setting, while clearly an abstraction, may be capturing better the environment facing
a majority of current and future members of the euro area.3
Finally, Ferrero (2006) also analyzes optimal monetary and ￿scal policy setting
in a two-country currency area. His contribution is complementary to ours, in that
2We leave out of our discussion examples of currency union models without explicit microfoun-
dations. See, e.g., Uhlig (2003), which provides a discussion of the losses from non-cooperation in a
static model with many ￿scal authorities and a central bank.
3In addition to the assumption of a continuum of countries, our model features two di⁄erences
relative to BJ, which in our opinion make it more appealing. First, we introduce home bias ￿thus
allowing for deviations from PPP and CPI in￿ ation di⁄erentials ￿whereas PPP holds continuosly in
BJ, implying identical CPI in￿ ation rates across union members. Second, our framework generates
an approximate welfare loss function featuring only the squares of in￿ ation, output gap and a ￿scal
gap, whereas the objective function in BJ takes a more complicated form, involving interaction terms
between selected endogenous variables.
3he includes a role for distortionary taxation and government debt. The presence of
government debt implies that the government budget balance is an explicit constraint
in the policy problem, leading to a modi￿ed optimal targeting rule for the union as a
whole, in which both current and past in￿ ation (as opposed to current in￿ ation only
as in our case) are proportional to the rate of change in the output gap. At the level
of each individual country, however, the optimal response to country-speci￿c shocks
still implies sizeable variability in the spending and tax gaps, even if policy in each
country is set optimally from a union-wide perspective.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model. In
Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium dynamics in a currency union, from the
perspective of both a single member economy and of the union as a whole. In Section
4 we study the e¢ cient allocation under ￿ exible prices. In Section 5 we highlight the
policy tradeo⁄s for both the Union as a whole and for each individual country. In
Section 6 we analyze optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in a currency union under
nominal rigidities. Section 7 concludes and suggests extensions for future work.
2 A Currency Union Model
We model the currency union as a closed system, made up of a continuum of small
open economies represented by the unit interval. Each economy, indexed by i 2
[0;1] is of measure zero; as a result, its domestic policy decisions do not have any
impact on the rest of the union. While di⁄erent economies are subject to imperfectly
correlated shocks, we assume that they share identical preferences, technology, and
market structure.5
Next we describe in detail the problem facing households and ￿rms in our model
economy.
2.1 Households
Consider a typical country belonging to the monetary union (say, country i). We
assume it is inhabited by an in￿nitely-lived representative household seeking to max-
4In addtion, the presence of distortionary taxes prevents Ferrero from using lump-sum taxes to
correct for the steady-state market power distortion. This requires employing the methodology of
Benigno and Woodford (2006) to derive an approximated welfare objective for the union.
5In Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) we used a similar modelling approach, though the focus of that
paper￿ the design of monetary policy in a single, small open economy with its own central bank￿ is















t denote, respectively, private consumption and hours of work, while Gi
t
is an index of public consumption, described in a separate section below.
More precisely, Ci
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where Ci
i;t is an index of country i￿ s consumption of domestic goods (i.e., goods














where j 2 [0;1] denotes the type of good (within the set produced in country i).6
Variable Ci











f;t is, in turn, the log of an index of the quantity of goods consumed
by country i￿ s households that are produced in (and, hence, imported from) country














Notice that in the speci￿cation of preferences described above ￿ 2 [0;1] is the
weight of imported goods in the utility of private consumption. Given that the weight
of the home economy in the union is in￿nitesimal, a value for ￿ strictly less than one
re￿ ects the presence of home bias in private consumption, implying that households
in di⁄erent countries will have di⁄erent consumption baskets.7 Equivalently, we can
think of ￿ as an index of openness.
6As discussed below, each country produces a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods, represented by
the unit interval. Each good is produced by a separate ￿rm. No good is produced in more than one
country.
7As a result, CPI in￿ ation di⁄erentials across countries may emerge, even if the law of one price
holds for each individual good.
5Finally, notice that parameter ￿ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between
varieties produced within any given country, independently of the producing country.




























for t = 0;1;2;:::, where P
f
t (j) is the price of good j produced in country f (expressed
in units of the single currency). Di
t+1 is the nominal payo⁄ in period t + 1 of the
portfolio held at the end of period t (and which may include shares in ￿rms, local
and foreign), W i
t is the nominal wage, and T i
t denotes lump-sum taxes.
We assume that households have access to a complete set of contingent claims,
traded across the union. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead
nominal payo⁄s, common across countries. Also, implicit in the notation in (5)￿ which
features a single country index for each price￿ is the assumption that the law of one
price holds across the union.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure on the goods produced in a given

































represents country i￿ s domestic price
index (i.e., an index of prices of domestically produced goods), for all i 2 [0;1].









is the price index for the bundle of goods imported from country f, as well as the































t df is the union-wide price index. From the
viewpoint of any individual country, P ￿
t is also a price index for imported goods.





f;t df = P ￿
t Ci
F;t
6Finally, and letting P i
c;t ￿ (P i
t)1￿￿(P ￿
t )￿ denote the consumer price index (CPI)
for country i, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported


















Combining all previous results, we can write total consumption expenditures by
country i￿ s households as P i
tCi
i;t + P ￿
t Ci
F;t = P i
c;tCi
t. Thus, and conditional on an
















In what follows we assume that the period utility takes the simple form




where parameter ￿ 2 [0;1) measures the weight attached to public consumption
(relative to private consumption).

























which are assumed to hold for all periods and states of nature (at t and t + 1, in the
case of (12)). Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (12) and rearranging


















EtfQt;t+1g is the gross nominal return on a riskless one-period discount
bond paying o⁄ one unit of the common currency in t + 1 or, for short, the (gross)
nominal interest rate. Below we assume that the union￿ s central bank uses that
interest rate as its main instrument of monetary policy.
For future reference it is useful to note that (11) and (13) can be respectively
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c;t+1g ￿ ￿) (14)
where, as before, lower case letters denote the logs of the respective variables, ￿ ￿
￿log￿ is the time discount rate, and ￿i
c;t ￿ pi
c;t ￿ pi
c;t￿1 is CPI in￿ ation. The above
optimality conditions hold for all i 2 [0;1]
2.1.1 Some De￿nitions and Identities
Before proceeding with our analysis, we introduce several assumptions and de￿nitions,
and derive a number of identities that are extensively used below.







t , i.e., the price of country f￿ s domestically produced goods in terms of
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t (15)
Hence, it follows that domestic in￿ation ￿de￿ned as the rate of change in the
price index for domestically produced goods, i.e., ￿i
t ￿ pi
t ￿ pi
t￿1 ￿and CPI in￿ation





t + ￿ ￿s
i
t (16)
which makes the gap between our two measures of in￿ ation proportional to the percent
change in the terms of trade, with the coe¢ cient of proportionality given by the index
of openness ￿.
8Notice that the distinction between CPI in￿ ation and domestic in￿ ation, while
meaningful at the level of each country, vanishes for the currency union as a whole.
Formally, integrating (15) over i 2 [0;1] and using the fact that
R 1
0 si










2.1.2 International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets for state-contingent securities across the
union, a ￿rst order condition analogous to (12) will hold for the representative house-


















Combining (12) and (17), we obtain:
C
i






for all i;f 2 [0;1] and all t, and where #i is a constant which will generally depend on
initial conditions. Henceforth, and without loss of generality, we assume symmetric
initial conditions (i.e., zero net foreign asset holdings for all countries, combined with
an ex-ante identical environment), in which case we have #i = # = 1 for all i 2 [0;1].













t df is the (log) aggregate consumption index for the union as a whole.
2.2 Optimal Allocation of Government Purchases














t(j) is the quantity of domestic good j purchased by the government. For
simplicity, we assume that government purchases are fully allocated to domestically
9produced goods.8
For any given level of public consumption Gi
t (whose determination is a central fo-
cus of the analysis below), the government is assumed to allocate expenditures across
goods in order to minimize total cost. This yields the following set of government













In order to focus our attention on the determination of its aggregate level and its
e⁄ects (rather than the distortions induced by its ￿nancing), we assume that govern-




Each country has a continuum of ￿rms represented by the interval [0;1]. Each ￿rm
produces a di⁄erentiated good with a linear technology:
Y
i





for all i;j 2 [0;1], where Ai
t is a country-speci￿c productivity shifter. The latter is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process (in logs):
a
i







t , ￿a 2 [0;1], and f"i
tg is white noise.
The assumption of a linear technology implies that the real marginal cost (ex-
pressed in terms of domestic goods) is common across ￿rms in any given country, and
given (in logs) by
mc
i


















denote the aggregate output index for country i.















8For OECD countries, there is evidence of strong home bias in government procurement, over









t dj. In the Appendix we show that equilibrium variations in
zi
t ￿ logZi
t around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus,
and up to a ￿rst order approximation, the following relationship between aggregate









Firms are assumed to set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). Hence,
a measure 1 ￿ ￿ of (randomly selected) ￿rms sets new prices each period, with an
individual ￿rm￿ s probability of re-optimizing in any given period being independent
of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. As is well known, the optimal price-
setting strategy for the typical ￿rm resetting its price in period t can be approximated
by the (log-linear) rule:9
p
i










t denotes the (log) of newly set prices in country i (same for all ￿rms reop-
timizing), and ￿ ￿ log ￿
￿￿1 is the (log) of the optimal markup in the corresponding
￿ exible price economy (or, equivalently, the markup prevailing in a zero in￿ ation
steady state).
9The approximation is carried out around a zero in￿ ation steady state. See the appendix in Gal￿
and Monacelli (2005) for a derivation in the context of a model with an identical price-setting block.
113 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Aggregate Demand and Output Determination
The clearing of market for good j produced in country i requires
Y
i






















































































and where the last equality makes use of (18). An analogous condition must hold for
all i;j 2 [0;1] and all t.









we obtain the following aggregate goods market clearing











A log-linear approximation to that market clearing condition around a (symmet-
ric) steady state is given by:10
b y
i
t = (1 ￿ ￿) (b c
i
t + ￿ s
i
t) + ￿ b g
i
t (26)
where a "b" symbol is used to denote log deviations of a variable from its steady
state value, e.g., b xt ￿ xt ￿ x, and where ￿ ￿ G
Y denotes the steady state government
spending share.
Using (19) and the terms of trade de￿nition, we can rewrite (26) as follows:
b y
i
t = ￿ b g
i
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b c
￿





The previous equation establishes that domestic output is positively related to
government spending, union-wide consumption (which is an index for the strength of
10The derivation makes use of a ￿rst order Taylor expansion of log(Y i
t ￿ Gi
t), as shown in the
Appendix. We also use the fact that in a symmetric steady state Si = 1 (and hence si = 0) for all
i 2 [0;1].
12foreign demand), and inversely related to domestic prices (relative to average prices
in the union).
Notice that we can integrate (27) over i 2 [0;1] in order to obtain the union-wide
goods market clearing condition:
b y
￿
t = ￿ b g
￿












Similarly, integrating (14) over i 2 [0;1] and combining the resulting di⁄erence
equation with (28), yields the following union-wide dynamic IS equation:
b y
￿
t = Etfb y
￿











t di. We can solve the previous equation forward and, under the
assumption that limT!1 Etfb g￿
t+Tg = limT!1 Etfb y￿
t+Tg = 0 , write it in level form as:
b y
￿
t = ￿ b g
￿








Hence, we see that ￿ uctuations in union-wide output will result from variations
in union-wide government spending and expected long-term rates, with the weight
attached to both factors being positively and negatively related, respectively, to the
steady state share of government spending in output.
3.2 The Supply Side: Marginal Cost and In￿ ation Dynamics
Given our assumption of price setting ￿ la Calvo, the dynamics of domestic in￿ ation in
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t+￿ denotes the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady
state, and ￿ ￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ .11
11Notice that under our assumptions the fact that each individual economy is open does not a⁄ect
the form of the equation relating domestic in￿ ation to the real marginal cost. See Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2005) for further discussion and a formal derivation.
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i) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿) (31)
We can now combine (31) with (22) and (26) to obtain an expression for the
marginal cost as a function of output and government spending, all expressed in
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i
t (32)
The intuition for the negative relationship between marginal cost and government
spending is easy to grasp: given output, an increase in government spending crowds
out domestic consumption and/or generates a real appreciation, both of which tend
to reduce real marginal cost through their negative e⁄ect on the product wage.12
In addition, we see that the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output
is increasing in the government share ￿. The reason is simple: in response to a
given percent increase in output, and given an unchanged current level of current
government spending b gi
t and technology ai
t, a larger ￿ is associated with a larger
percent increase in consumption and/or the terms of trade. As a result, a larger
increase in the product wage and, hence, marginal cost will obtain.
Combining (30) and (32) we can derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (NKPC), applying to each economy in the union:
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i















t ￿ ￿(1 + ’) a
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t (33)
Notice also that by integrating the previous equation over i 2 [0;1] we can obtain
the corresponding new Keynesian Phillips curve for the union as a whole:
￿
￿























12Notice that the corresponding elasticity is increasing in ￿, since the greater the weight of gov-
ernment spending in aggregate demand the larger will be the percent decline in consumption needed
to keep output constant.
14We have now derived the set of log-linear equilibrium conditions for in￿ ation and
output in each individual country (summarized by (27) and (33)), as well as for the
union as a whole (given by (29) and (34)), as a function of government spending
(local and union-wide) and the common interest rate. Given the equilibrium path for
those variables, one can use (14) (or, equivalently, (12)) to back out the equilibrium
consumption in each country.
Next we turn to the analysis of optimal policy design in the context of the above
model. In the next section, and as a starting point of our analysis, we determine the
e¢ cient allocation and its implementation under ￿ exible prices.
4 The E¢ cient Allocation
In the present section we derive the e¢ cient allocation and show how it can be
supported in equilibrium when prices are fully ￿ exible. This will prove a useful
benchmark for the analysis of optimal policy in the presence of nominal rigidities, to
which we turn later.
4.1 The Social Planner￿ s Problem
The union￿ s optimal allocation in any given period can be described as the solution
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for all i 2 [0;1]. Notice that the previous constraints already embed the optimal
condition whereby the di⁄erent good types in any given country should be produced
and consumed in identical quantities.13
Under our speci￿cation of preferences, the optimality conditions for the social
planner￿ s problem are:
13That condition in turn implies that Zi




















for all i 2 [0;1]. In words, the marginal loss of utility for a household in country i
of producing an additional unit of the composite good, given by (Ni
t)’=Ai
t, must be
equal, at the margin, to the utility gain resulting from any of the three possible uses
of that additional output: consumption by domestic households, consumption by all
households in the union, and domestic government spending.
Using the resource constraint (35), and the fact that Y i
t = Ai
tNi
t, we can guess
and verify that the solution to the social planner￿ s problem is given by:
N
i
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t (40)
for all i;f 2 [0;1], and all t.
Combining (38) and (39), together with de￿nition of country i￿ s total consumption



























t df is an index of union-wide productivity.
Aggregating over countries, we obtain the corresponding optimal allocation for
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164.2 Decentralization of the E¢ cient Allocation under Flexi-
ble Prices
Next we show how the union-wide optimal allocation derived above can be supported
as an equilibrium in the presence of ￿exible prices. Letting variables with an upper
















































In order for the equilibrium allocation under ￿ exible prices to correspond to the
union￿ s socially optimal allocation the following conditions must be satis￿ed for all






Secondly, government spending must be set according to the rule14
G
i
t = ￿ A
i
t (43)
If both conditions are satis￿ed for all i 2 [0;1], the ￿ exible price equilibrium will
yield the level of employment and output in each country that is optimal from the





t = 1, for all i 2 [0;1], and all t.15 It is easy
to check that the remaining optimality conditions will also be satis￿ed as a result of
households￿optimization.
Notice that in the economy with ￿ exible prices, the lack of an autonomous mon-
etary policy is of no consequence for the attainment of the optimal allocation, for
14Or, equivalently, G
i
t = ￿ Y
i
t
15In contrast with Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005), where the optimal allocation problem is analyzed
from the viewpoint of a small open economy, here the choice of the subsidy is not a⁄ected by any
desire to in￿ uence the terms of trade in a country￿ s favor. The reason is simple: that goal cannot be
attained by all countries simultaneously, and hence it serves no purpose when trying to decentralize
the solution to the union￿ s social planner problem. As a result the only role played by the subsidy
is to o⁄set ￿rms￿market power.
17monetary policy is neutral in that environment (it can only in￿ uence the path of
prices). As a result, local ￿scal authorities can focus exclusively on the e¢ cient
provision of public consumption goods, according to rule (43) (shadowing the cen-
tral planner￿ s decisions on that front). In our example economy that rule implies a




t = ￿ = ￿ for all t.
While the level of prices in the union and in each individual country is determined
by the monetary policy regime, each country￿ s terms of trade as well as the in￿ ation
di⁄erentials vis a vis the union are fully determined by real factors in the present
scenario. More speci￿cally, note that the path for the terms of trade that will support














for all i 2 [0;1], and all t. Given the de￿nition of the terms of trade it follows that











We have thus shown how under ￿ exible prices the e¢ cient allocation can be sup-
ported in equilibrium through an appropriate choice of a subsidy (to eliminate market
power distortion) and government spending policies (focused on providing the e¢ cient
level of public goods). In that context, the policy pursued by the common central
bank is of no relevance, since it can only in￿ uence aggregate in￿ ation, which under
our assumptions generates no distortions. Not surprisingly, things are considerably
di⁄erent when nominal rigidities are present, the case to which we turn next.
5 Sticky Prices and Policy Tradeo⁄s in the Cur-
rency Union
In the presence of nominal rigidities (and, in particular, of sticky prices) it is generally
unfeasible for a monetary union to attain the e¢ cient allocation. The reasons are well
understood. First, nominal rigidities imply that the level of employment and output
within each country may di⁄er from the e¢ cient one both in aggregate terms and, in
the case of staggered price setting, in terms of its distribution across sectors (i.e., types
of goods). This is true even if, assumed above, the distortion associated with market
18power is o⁄set by means of a subsidy. Secondly, the sluggish adjustment of prices,
combined with the impossibility of nominal exchange rate adjustments (inherent to
a currency union), implies that the changes in terms of trade that are required to
support the optimal allocation cannot occur instantaneously.
As shown in Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) in the context of a related model, when
each individual country has its own currency and an autonomous monetary policy (as
opposed to the monetary union case considered here), stabilization of the domestic
price level in each country guarantees that the ￿ exible price equilibrium (and, hence,
the optimal allocation) is attained. As we show next, this is no longer possible under
a currency union, at least to the extent that di⁄erent countries experience asymmetric
shocks. As a result, several tradeo⁄s arise, forcing policymakers to settle for a second
best outcome. Next we discuss the nature of those tradeo⁄s, looking in turn at
those facing each of the union￿ s members (and, hence, their ￿scal authorities) and,







t denote the (logs) of output and government spending
in country i associated with the union-wide e¢ cient allocation (or equivalently, with
the ￿ exible price equilibrium under an optimal policy). We use the notation e yi
t and
e gi
t to denote the log deviations of country i￿ s output and government spending from
those benchmark levels, i.e., e yi
t ￿ yi
t ￿ yi
t and e gi
t ￿ gi
t ￿ gi
t, which we henceforth refer
to as country i￿ s output gap and government spending gap, respectively.
It will prove convenient to de￿ne the following measure of the ￿scal stance:
e f
i
t ￿ e g
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which we henceforth refer to as the ￿scal gap.16
Using (32), together with the fact that yi
t ￿ yi = gi
t ￿ gi = ai
t (where variables
without time subscripts denote steady state values), we can derive the following
16Strictly speaking, gi
t and, hence, e gi
t are only well de￿ned if ￿ > 0, which we assume for the
remainder of this section.

























where we have imposed an optimal steady state government spending share (￿ = ￿).
We can combine the previous expression with (30) to obtain a version of the new
Keynesian Phillips curve for each union member, expressing domestic in￿ ation in













In addition we can combine (27), (28) and (44), to obtain an equation determining
the change in the output gap di⁄erential as a function of the di⁄erentials in ￿scal gap
changes, in￿ ation and productivity growth:
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The previous two equations describe the evolution of country i￿ s output gap and
price level as a function of the domestic ￿scal gap, given the productivity di⁄erential
and the union wide ￿scal and output gaps. They also make clear the nature of
the tradeo⁄ facing ￿scal authorities of union member countries. To illustrate those
tradeo⁄s, assume that e y￿
t = e f￿
t = p￿
t = 0. Consider equation (45), describing the
evolution of the price level in country i. That equation implies that by closing the
output and ￿scal gaps at all times (and thus trying to replicate the ￿ exible price
equilibrium allocation), domestic prices would be fully stabilized. Yet, (46) makes
clear that, in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks, closing the output gap
(without creating a ￿scal gap) requires that the terms of trade and, hence, domestic
prices, adjust.
5.2 Union-Wide Tradeo⁄s
The evolution of in￿ ation, the output gap, and the ￿scal gap for the currency union is
described by two aggregate equilibrium relations. Thus, by integrating (45), we can
derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve describing union-wide in￿ ation
in terms of the output and ￿scal gaps:
20￿
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t = ￿ Etf￿
￿








The union￿ s output gap is determined by a dynamic IS-type equation, which we
can derive using (29):
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￿
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t is the union￿ s natural rate of interest, given by
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= ￿ + Etf￿y
￿
t+1g
= ￿ + Etf￿a
￿
t+1g
Notice that, to the extent that the union￿ s aggregate ￿scal gap e f￿
t remains stable
at zero, there is no tradeo⁄ between stabilization of the output gap and in￿ ation for
the union as a whole. In that case the outcome e y￿
t = e ￿
￿
t = 0 could be easily attained
by having the central bank follow a rule of the sort
rt = rr
￿
t + ￿￿ ￿
￿
t
On the other hand, if the aggregated decisions of the local ￿scal authorities lead
to ￿ uctuations in the union-wide ￿scal gap, the job of the single central bank is
considerably more di¢ cult. To illustrate this formally, notice that we can integrate
(48) and combine it with (47) to yield:
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Notice that a positive union-wide ￿scal gap, current and/or anticipated, will gen-
erate upward pressure on current in￿ ation. That pressure can only be partly o⁄set
by having the central bank run a tighter monetary policy, which would require rais-
ing current and/or future interest rates above their natural level, thus dampening
the expansionary impact of members￿￿scal policies on the union￿ s output gap and
in￿ ation. Below we show that this is indeed the sort of rule that the union￿ s central
bank should adopt, as part of the optimal monetary-￿scal policy mix for the union.
216 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Cur-
rency Union
Next we derive and characterize the optimal ￿scal-monetary regime in the currency
union. This regime involves full coordination of the monetary and ￿scal authorities,
as if all policy decisions were centralized in a single policymaker, whose objective is
to maximize the average welfare of union households.
Note ￿rst that the policymakers￿joint objective function corresponds to that of the
social planner considered in section 3. Thus it should be clear that they will choose
the same e¢ cient steady state, which is feasible and can be supported by means of
the constant subsidy (42). Fluctuations about that steady state will in general be
ine¢ cient, for the reasons discussed in the previous section. In the Appendix we show
that a second order approximation to the average utility losses of union households



























di + tips (49)
where tips denotes terms that are independent of policy.17
We de￿ne the optimal policy as the set of rules for the ￿scal gaps fe fi
tg for all
i 2 [0;1] and the common interest rate fr￿
tg, along with the associated second best
outcomes f￿i
t, e yi




























tg, for all i 2 [0;1]; that maximize (49) subject to (45), (46)
and (50). Secondly, given the solution to that ￿rst-stage problem, we determine the
interest rate rule that will support the implied paths for the union-wide in￿ ation,
output gap and ￿scal gap, using (48).
17A comparison with the welfare objective derived in Ferrero (2006) is instructive. First, we
feature a term in the average ￿scal gap, since useful government spending - rather than taxes - is
the policy objective. Second, Ferrero features a squared term in the terms of trade, while we do
not. Importantly, this derives from our currency area model being one of a continuum of countries,
rather than one with a typical two-country structure. A direct comparison with the welfare objective
derived in BJ is instead more di¢ cult, since BJ face a series of cross-product terms which are of
non-conventional welfare interpretation.
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f;t are the
(discounted) Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints in (45), (46) and (50),
and where  
i
￿;￿1 = 0.
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Both can be combined to yield
￿ ￿
￿
t + ￿e y
￿
t = 0 (58)
for t = 1;2;3;::: whereas for t = 0 we have ￿ ￿￿
0 + e y￿
0 = 0.
Integrating (53) over i 2 [0;1], combining the resulting equation with (56) and
the result above, we obtain:
e f
￿
t = ￿e y
￿
t (59)
Notice that (58) and (59), together with the union-wide equilibrium conditions
(47) and (48), imply that the equilibrium under the optimal policy will satisfy
￿
￿
t = e y
￿
t = e f
￿
t = 0 (60)
23for all t. This is one of the central results emerging from our analysis. In words, we
may state it as follows: the combined monetary-￿scal policy mix must be such that,
at the union level, in￿ ation, the output gap and the ￿scal gap remain at a constant
(zero) value, at all times. That condition requires, in turn, that the equilibrium
interest rate r￿
t equals the union-wide natural rate rr￿
t at all times. As argued above,
and conditional on e f￿
t = 0 for all t, the union￿ s central bank can implement the
desired outcome by adopting a policy rule of the form:
rt = rr
￿
t + ￿￿ ￿
￿
t
where ￿￿ > 1.
What are the paths of in￿ ation and the output gap for each union member asso-
ciated with the optimal policy? What ￿scal policy will support those paths?
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i
￿;t (61)
In this second best environment, as long as prices are less than fully ￿ exible, we
have  
i
￿;t > 0. Hence (61) immediately implies that, unlike the union-wide policy
prescription (60), setting e fi
t = e yi
t = 0 for each member country i cannot be an
equilibrium under the optimal policy.







y;tdi (from (54)) must evolve exogenously from the viewpoint of
the single member country. By substituting (54), (55) and (56) into (51), (52) and
















and stochastic processes fai
t, a￿
tg, along with the initial condition  
i
￿;￿1 = 0. Next
we illustrate the implied equilibrium dynamics and the optimal policy responses by
means of some simulations.
6.1 Dynamic Simulations
In this section we illustrate the equilibrium behavior for a prototype member economy
under the optimal policy arrangement described above. We resort to a series of
dynamic simulations, and adopt the following benchmark calibration. We assume
’ = 3, which implies a labor supply elasticity of 1
3, and a steady-state markup ￿ = 1:2,
which implies that ￿, the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods (of the
24same origin), is 6. Parameter ￿ is set to a benchmark value of 0:75 (a value consistent
with an average period of one year between price adjustments), and report results
for alternative values. We assume ￿ = 0:99, which implies a riskless annual return
of about 4 percent in the steady state. As for the ￿scal sector, we parameterize the
steady state share of government spending in output as ￿ = ￿ = 0:25, roughly the
average share of government consumption in GDP for the euro zone.
We follow the real business cycle literature (King and Rebelo (1999)) and assume
the following autoregressive process for labor productivity in country i:
a
i
t = 0:95 a
i
t￿1 + "i;t (62)
Figure 1 displays impulse responses for a number of domestic variables to a one
percent country-speci￿c rise in productivity for alternative values of the price sticki-
ness parameter ￿. In particular, ￿ = 0 represents the limiting case of full (domestic)
price ￿ exibility.
Consider ￿rst the case of full price ￿ exibility (￿ = 0). In that case there is no loss
of e¢ ciency associated with in￿ ation, since the latter no longer creates any relative
price distortions. Hence, as shown in the ￿gure, it is optimal to fully close the ￿scal
gap and the output gap, in response to asymmetric movements in productivity.18 As
a result, it is optimal for the union member experiencing a productivity increase to
fully absorb the latter through an adjustment in the terms of trade brought about
by a change in the domestic price level, while maintaining output and government
spending at their ￿rst-best levels.
To the extent that price stickiness is present (￿ > 0), there are welfare losses associ-
ated with departures from price stability, in addition to those stemming from nonzero
output and ￿scal gaps. However -as discussed above- the ￿ exible price/e¢ cient al-
location is not feasible under the currency union regime. In particular, the rise in
productivity must be absorbed only via a gradual and persistent fall in the price
level, with the consequent relative price distortions. As a result, the optimal policy
mix requires expanding the ￿scal gap to bring about the rise in demand necessary
to accommodate the desired expansion in output, thus smoothing the adjustment
of prices over time. To see that formally, notice that in the equilibrium under the
optimal policy equation (46) simpli￿es to:
18In fact, under price ￿ exibility, equation (45) does not act as a constraint on the evolution of


















t (and where, without loss of generality, we have normalized p￿
t = 0).
Hence, to the extent that the price level reacts gradually, the rise in productivity will
be absorbed via a combination of a fall in the output gap and a rise in the ￿scal gap.
In general, the local ￿scal authority is required to trade-o⁄movements in in￿ ation on
the one hand with movements in the output and ￿scal gap on the other. The higher
the degree of price rigidity, the larger the implied ￿ uctuations of both gaps under the
optimal policy.19
Notice that, under our benchmark calibration, welfare losses from any given out-
put gap variation are of an order of magnitude larger than the ones implied by the
same variation in the ￿scal gap. This explains why in Figure 1 the implied volatility
of the ￿scal gap is larger than the one in the output gap. The optimal balance be-
tween the two variables will in general depend on the relative weights attached to the
quadratic terms in e yi
t and e fi
t in the welfare loss function (49). These weights depend
in turn on parameters ’ and ￿. The lower the elasticity of labor supply (i.e., the
larger ’) the smaller the adjustment in the output gap (relative to the ￿scal gap),
whereas the larger ￿ (the share of government spending in the optimal steady state)
the lower the adjustment brought about via the ￿scal gap (relative to the output
gap).
7 Conclusions
We have developed a tractable multicountry framework suitable for monetary and
￿scal policy analysis in a currency union. As an application, we have determined
the optimal monetary-￿scal policy mix in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to
productivity. Given our assumed nominal rigidities, the presence of those shocks,
combined with the impossibility of resorting to nominal exchange rate adjustments,
induces an ine¢ cient response of the terms of trade that justi￿es the use of ￿scal
policy as a stabilization tool. In particular, the union-wide optimal policy calls for
variations in local government spending that go beyond the mere e¢ cient provision
of public goods. On the other hand, the union￿ s central bank should seek to stabilize
19The impulse response results, at least qualitatively, are similar to the ones obtained in BJ.
The welfare interpretation, though, is di⁄erent, given that the welfare objectives are not readily
comparable.
26the price level in the union as a whole.
Our framework is amenable to extensions along several dimensions. In order
to meet our self-imposed tractability requirement, we have restricted ourselves to
less-than-general parametric speci￿cations for utility and technology. The work of
Forlati (2007) addresses some of the challenges arising from the relaxation of those
assumptions. Our model ignores other aspects that are likely to be relevant for the
design of optimal policies. Missing elements include, among others, the presence of
sticky wages (along with sticky prices), the need to rely on distortionary taxes, the
e⁄ects of government debt policies, and the likely existence of non-fully Ricardian
behavior on the part of households. Finally, our framework assumes the presence
of complete international ￿nancial markets. By relaxing the assumption of perfect
risk-sharing, one could presumably generate a complementary role for ￿scal policy
as a cross-country insurance tool. The emergence of a potential con￿ ict between the
latter and the stabilization role described in the present paper is likely to constitute
an interesting avenue worth exploring in future research. We plan to pursue some of
those extensions in future work.
27A Union￿ s Welfare Loss
For notational simplicity we omit country subscripts, unless needed.
Taylor expansion of log(Yt ￿ Gt)
Let ￿ ￿ G
Y the steady state government spending share. De￿ne b yt ￿ log Yt
Y and
b gt ￿ log Gt
G . A second-order Taylor expansion of log(Yt ￿ Gt) about the steady state
yields:
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(1 ￿ ￿)2 (b gt ￿ b yt)
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Let e yt = yt ￿ yt and e gt = gt ￿ gt denote the output and ￿scal gaps, respectively,
as de￿ned in the text. Note that= b yt = e yt + (yt ￿ y) and b gt = e gt + (gt ￿ g): Hence,
b gt ￿ b yt = e gt ￿ e yt + (gt ￿ yt) ￿ log￿.
Quite generally, gt and yt will depend on exogenous shocks only. In the present
model, gt￿yt = log￿. Thus, when considering ￿ uctuations about the e¢ cient steady
state (with ￿ = ￿) we have b gt ￿ b yt = e gt ￿ e yt, allowing to write:
log(Yt ￿ Gt) ’
1
1 ￿ ￿






















28Using the fact that
R 1
0 si
t di = 0 and assuming a common (optimal) steady state
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where b nt ￿ log Nt
N . In the model in the text, the steady state about which the economy
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The next step consists in rewriting the previous expression in terms of the output










dj , we have
b nt = b yt ￿ at + zt
= e yt + zt







dj, and where we use the fact that yt = at:
The following lemma shows that zt is proportional to the cross-sectional distrib-
ution of relative prices (and, hence, of second order).
29Lemma 1: zt ’ ￿
2 varjfpt(j)g
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Using the previous results we can thus rewrite the second order approximation
to the disutility of labor about that steady state in terms of the output gap and the
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Collecting results and reintroducing country subscripts, we can write the second
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Proof: see appendix 2.











































30B Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
Lemma 1: zt ’ ￿
2 varjfpt(j)g





= exp[(1 ￿ ￿) b pt(j)]































































Proof: we make use of the following property of the Calvo model, as shown in















￿ , as in the text. The desired result follows trivially from Lemma
1.
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Figure 1: Domestic Productivity Shock under the Optimal Policy.
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